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RESEARCH ESSAY 
BUI HAl THI�M 
Pluralism Unleashed: The Politics of 
Reforming the Vietnamese Constitution 
A s Vietnam approaches the landmark �niversaries of forty years since reunification and thirty years since Doi Moi [Renovation] was initi­
ated, the prospects for political and social change in the country have 
received heightened attention and discussion. Over the past few decades, 
Vietnam has undergone market-based reforms in the economic sphere first 
as a survival strategy in response to imminent economic and social crisis in 
the mid-198os and later as an important source for performance-based 
legitimacy to bolster one-party rule on grounds of economic success. The 
resilience of the old-style Leninist political system and governance in Viet­
nam, along with a resistance to political reforms, has been a bone of con­
tention among different commentators, observers, and activists. With.in that 
context, different conditions and potentials have been explored to make 
sense of political developments in Vietnam. 
For the past few years, the resilience of the political system has been 
seriously called into question due to the increasingly grave situation in 
many important areas of governance, and significant debates have emerged 
about the need for substantive change and transformation to overcome 
another imminent crisis of governance. A series of critical concerns has 
been raised about economic mismanagement, evidenced by the collapse of 
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large state-owned conglomerates like Vinashin and Vinalines, the death of 
hundred thousands of businesses, and massive debts incurred by the gov­
ernment.1 Other endemic problems such as the structure of the economy, 
which is biased towards highly extractive development/ as well as environ­
mental degradation, rampant corruption, limited access to justice, and wors­
ening quality and services in education and healthcare have all contributed 
to a rising frustration in society. Long-standing political institutions have 
been far from effective in responding to the demands for meaningful change 
and have been retreating into defensive reactions. The established rules and 
norms underlined by orthodox narratives have been seriously challenged by 
different social forces straining to break political passivity and stimulate 
change. While regaining and maintaining high economic growth with mac-
.· roeconomk stability is a formidable challenge for Vietnam, accommodating 
expanding social demands and calls for substantive political participation is 
no less of a challenge. 
Amid serious problems in governance and institutional weaknesses, pro­
posals for amending the 1992 Constitution were discussed in the years 
leading to the 2011 National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV). A major decision was reached at the Party Congress, allowing 
amendments of the Constitution to be put on the table for discussions 
beyond limited official circles and with wide participation from the public. 
The process of reforming the Vietnamese Constitution opened up a Pan­
dora's box of resistance and contestations over the established rules and 
norms, which specify the range of actions considered legitimate and set the 
standards and expectations that govern or control the behavior of actors/ 
entities. It catalyzed the emergence and assertion of plural identities and 
interests with the proposed amendments to the 1992 Constitution represent­
ing a focal point in the exercise of discursive power and struggles for change. 
In this process, the significant role of the blogosphere was brought into play 
with a view to generating pressure for reform. The new players took to this 
new battleground to engage critically with constitutional politics and 
amplify their voice in the public sphere. 
This article discusses the significance of the conflict in the constitutional 
reform process that was initiated in 2011. Despite initial emphasis on stability 
and harmonious integration by the party-state, constitutional amendment 
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proposals were compromised and renegotiated in the face of sustained criti­
cisms of the draft constitutional amendments that drew on non-orthodox 
ideological foundations. In the process, party-state leaders struggled to man­
age the increasingly diverse and strident calls for fundamental systemic 
change. They found it difficult to accommodate broader political participa­
tion by accepting a wider scope of compromises and concessions to continue 
producing consent in the society, while perpetuating their own way of com­
mand and control over constitutional ideas and norms. Even though the 
party-state resisted major changes in the fmal constitutional text issued in 
November 2013, the debates shed light on the emergence of a complex 
spectrum of values and identifications that challenged the conventional 
narratives o.f party-state institutions. The contestation that characterizes 
constitutional reform discourses reveals that conflict is a significant driver 
of political and ideological changes presently underway in Vietnam. 
For the development of my argument, I will first present some theoretical 
discussion on discourses and discursive power with regards to Vietnam's 
prospects for political transformation. After a brief account of the role of the 
Constitution in Vietnam and the history of amending the Constitution since 
Dbi Moi, I discuss the perspectives of the old guard and the new emerging 
players as well as their methods and forums in this constitutional reform 
process. I then use this frame of reference to inform my analysis of major 
discourses that traditionally have shaped constitutional parameters. These 
discourses took place across key themes examined in this article, including 
party domination, constitutional review, and popular sovereignty over the 
Constitution. In each of these discourses, I will outline both the master 
narratives that dominate the discourse and the counter-hegemonic narra­
tives that have sought to challenge them. 
Discourse and Discursive Power in Vietnam's Prospect 
for Political Change 
Engagement with discourses is a powerful and effective way to understand 
the current politics of reforming the Vietnamese Constitution. Discourses 
are important because they are a shared way of apprehending the world and 
the vehicles through which we give meanings to the world that we shape, 
produce and reproduce.3 In this respect, Joan Scott provides a useful 
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definition of discourse as "a historically, socially, and institutionally specific 
structure of statements, terms, categories and beliefs."4 Discourses construct 
meanings and power relations that help define both common sense and 
knowledge. Remarkably, each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments 
and contentions that provide "basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements 
and disagreements."5 Discursive power originates from the ability of dis­
courses to structure and coordinate the actions of individuals and entities 
subject wholly or partly to them. It is through examining discourses that we 
have a more in-depth understanding of power relations, the hegemonic 
order, and the potential and conditions for a transition to a new order. 
In the context of Vietnam, studying discourse offers a powerful way to 
make sense of political transformation and/or a lack thereof. Deliberations 
in the constitutional reform process between 2011 and 2013 had the effect of 
shaping and reshaping parameters for change. According to John Dryzek, 
most democratization scholars focus on electoral competition and effective 
constitutional respect for basic civil liberties and human rights at the 
expense of an emphasis on deliberation without which democratization 
cannot do.6 The emergence of new players in a discourse is partly prompted 
by the prospect of constructing a new constitutional order "through the 
willing agency of representatives of the old order in cooperation with the 
newly empowered agents of modernity."7 There is no clear evidence of 
cooperation between those forces within the current regime and radical 
agents of change in the middle class, though some strong dissidence has 
come from within the elite ranks of the CPV and the loyal opposition. 8 
According to Zachary Abuza, the impetus for political reform normally 
comes from the elite ranks in the form of some ordinary evolution where 
the party-state would become more responsive to these elitist pressures. 
In a similar vein, Martin Gainsborough argues about the transformation 
taking the form of "a broadening of political space within the state" and 
discounts the role of a rising assertive civil society in bringing about change.9 
Although there is significant merit in the elitist and statist approach to 
political transformation in Vietnam, underestimating social forces tends to 
offer little analytical utility in understanding the emergence of plural iden­
tities and interests or contestations in discourses. The kind of mixed and 
complex state behaviours toward changes in values and norms is interpreted 
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by Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet in a dialogical model of state-society relations to 
strike a better balance between the agency of social forces and the hegemonic 
power of the state.10 This dialogical model provides more analytical utility to 
discourses and discursive power as a means to explore the politics of con­
stitutional reform in Vietnam. This is because discourses have a crucial role 
in institutionalizing norms and behaviors. The dialogic model finds potency 
in the conflicts between hegemonic narratives and counter-hegemonic nar­
ratives in the discourses. The constitutional reform process has become "an 
arena of constant competition, conflict, and clash of ideas."11 It is conflict 
that has driven a broadening of political space in Vietnam. 
In Vietnam's constitutional discourses, the systems of meanings and 
knowledge are organized and negotiated among many actors and institu­
tions so that "political claims are legitimated, making particular actions seem 
normal or inevitable.''12 Understanding how competing systems of mean­
ings and interpretations are constructed and clash is key to making sense of 
power relations. Immersing ourselves in the discourses where a particular 
language game is being played or used and a particular system of meanings is 
constructed or contested allows us to include and exclude certain options, 
ideas and possibilities via a better understanding of the mechanisms. A sim­
ilar point is made by John Gillespie about the value of framing discourses in 
that "social actors can deploy language in strategic ways to realize particular 
sets of interests."13 The caveat here is that the tacit recognition by the 
Vietnamese party-state of the existence of competing narratives and 
counter-hegemonic discourses from different societal groups should not 
be interpreted as an emergent pluralist political system. Rather, the recog­
nition might represent certain possibilities and potential conditions to chal­
lenge the hegemonic discourse and the dominant order as a basis for 
effecting transformation. 
The Role of the Constitution in Vietnam and 
Constitutional Reform Since Dbi Mai 
The role of the Constitution in Vietnam, just like the role of law in general, 
has been traditionally understood in an instrumentalist perspective. In fact, 
it has been a tool of governance by the CPV whose edges should be 
re-sharpened from time to time in response to new needs at the total 
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discretionary power of the CPV. For example, the 1980 Constitution was 
meant to serve as an important instrument for the re-unified Vietnam to 
build socialism. The 1992 Constitution was to serve effectively the market­
based reforms initiated in late198os.14 In the orthodox thinking of the CPV 
leadership, the Constitution is a manifestation and institutionalization of the 
party's political platform. The CPV General Secretary asserted this line of 
thought at a meeting with his constituency in Hi N<?i on September 28, 
2013, noting that "the Constitution is the most important political and legal 
document after the party's political platform.''1s 
However, there have always been contestations and challenges to the 
party's dominant narrative of the Constitution and law, even during the 
pinnacle of the socialist era. Mark Sidel provides a comprehensive historical 
account of modern conflict-over the role.of law .with party domination.16 
The discourse about the role of the Constitution historically is situated 
broadly within that context, particularly before D6i M6i. Although consti­
tutional drafting and revision in Vietnam, as Sidel opined, "is a constant 
process of dialogue and debate,"17 such processes occurred only in the 
background and behind closed doors among a limited circle before the 
1990s. Those dialogues and ·debates have come to the foreground in a more 
visible way and have been accessible to a larger circle and the public since 
D6i M6i. 
Constitutional change in Vietnam in recent decades has become more 
closely related to general political and legal narratives about the role of law in 
ordering state institutions and even party organizations and members. Ef­
forts to build a socialist law-based state in the past two decades is evidence of 
the increased spread of legality into party, state and social institutions. 
Against that background, the meaning of a constitutional change has gone 
beyond a mere announcement of party policy to a legally binding force. The 
space for constitutional debates is no longer monopolized by party-state 
institutions in a compliant way but has been increasingly broadened for new 
players with different voices. It is this dynamic character of constitutional 
change that makes the constitutional reform process worth studying. 
By the early 1990s, the CPV' s need for a more effective tool of governance 
to embrace market-based reforms had led to a decision to amend the 1980 
Constitution.18 Throughout the implementation of the 1980 Constitution, 
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there had been various problems with fence-breaking efforts at both central 
and local levels.19 The 1987 Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam obvi­
ously went beyond the parameters set for the economic regime in the 1980 
Constitution. The process of revising the 1980 Constitution took "an 
unprecedented level of debate and publicity" and "an unusually long time."20 
In the official narrative of the 1992 Constitution, the rationale for amend­
ments was to institutionalize the new vision of socialism set out in the 1991 
Political Platform and the rules and norms in other party documents. 21 The 
1980 Constitution Amending Committee (CAC), chaired by Vo Chi Cong, 
was established as early as June 1989 to lay the groundwork for extensive 
drafting of constitutional amendments. 22 The CAC produced four official 
drafts, the third of which was released in late December 1991 for public 
consultation between January and March 1992. The final draft was subject to 
heated debate and close scrutiny at the National Assembly (NA) meeting in 
March to April 1992 and adopted on April 15, 1992.23 The revised Consti­
tution had extensive changes in terms of wording: 115 out of 147 articles were 
revised, and twenty-three new articles were added. However, many of these 
articles were "retrospective rather than prescriptive, affirming developments 
that had already taken place since [Dbi M&i]."24 What is important about the 
process of amending the 1980 Constitution is its status as the first test for 
different social forces in Vietnam to propel the process of change, which could 
then draw on the support and guarantee from the 1992 Constitution. 
Not long after its adoption, the 1992 Constitution was subject to a deci­
sion for further amendments due to the increasing irrelevance of some 
provisions that caused problems in economic development and governance 
structures, representing a far cry from current party and state policies. 
Expressing firm confidence in its capacity to manage the process, the NA 
set up the 1992 CAC in June 2001, chaired by Nguyen Van An.2s The 
Committee produced a draft of amendments released for public comments 
for one month (from August 15 to Septemben5, 2001). Despite such a short 
time and attempts by party-state leaders and conservative legal scholars to 
confine commenting to specific areas, the process was supplied with repre­
sentations from diverse interests and demands, many of which sought to 
expand the scope of the debate beyond issues pre-approved for discussion.26 
Some liberal constitutionalist intellectuals within party-state circles such as 
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Di�p Van Son, Nguyen Van Thao and Nguyen Dang Dung pressed for 
substantive political reform through a fundamental constitutional change. 
Given the context of Vietnam in the early 2ooos, when economic success was 
seemingly on the way and social policies had been working well enough to 
accommodate the increasing needs of the people, the party-state managed to 
close down the process quickly. By December 2001, the NA had passed final 
amendments. 27 
The process of constitutional amendments in 2001 ended with unsatis­
factory results as many important issues such as constitutional enforcement/ 
protection and local governance had been left out, even as the party-state 
recognized their significance. Former NA Chairman Nguyen Van An 
lamented that "we have amended the Constitution many times but it has 
. not measured up to requirements."28 What was stirred up in the 2001 
deliberations has proven to have long-lasting effects. These critical issues 
included, but were not limited to a clearer delineation of authorities among 
state institutions; control within and devolution to local government; party 
leadership over the state; judiciary institutions; options for constitutional 
review; and confidence votes. It is the party-state that then took up the issues 
of constitutional protection and local governance again during the frrst 
decade of the 2ooos.29 It was still struggling with these issues when it re­
initiated a new round of constitutional amendments in 2011 following de­
liberations throughout 2010 among party-state officials, and legal scholars 
from state-owned research institutions and the NA. 
As a rule, any constitutional reform is subject to close leadership and 
supervision by the party. The Eleventh National Congress of the CPV held in 
January 2011 authorized a constitutional reform to "promptly conduct 
research, amend, and supplement the 1992 Constitution in line with new 
realities."3o Upon the official green light given by the Second Plenum of the 
CPV Central Committee in early July 2011, relevant state institutions fol­
lowed suit. In its first session, the thirteenth term NA decided to set up the 
1992 Constitution Amending Committee (CAC) chaired by the newly 
elected NA Chairman Nguyen Sinh Hi.mg.31 The NA set a timeframe for 
the CAC to conclude the whole process by November 2013, when the final 
draft of the amendments would be adopted. Earlier, in a preparatory 
arrangement, a major state-level research project chaired by Uong Chu Ltiu, 
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Vice Chairman of the NA, was approved for the period between March 2011 
and March 2013. This extensive research project involved efforts and per­
sonnel from party-state sponsored institutions such as the NA (Institute for 
Legislative Studies), the Vietnam Academy of Social Science (Institute of 
State and Law), the Hb Chi Minh Academy of Politics and Administration, 
the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations, the Ministry of 
Justice (Institute of Legal Science), the Vietnam National University-Ha N(>i 
(School of Law), and the Office of the CPV Central Committee. Most pro­
minent legal scholars from this research project served on the editorial board 
that assisted the 1992 CAC. 
The whole process was supposed to be heavily guarded by the Party. The 
2011 to 2012 period was intended for a review of the implementation of the 
·- 1992 Constitution at all levels nationwide and for the 1992 CAC to prepare. 
the groundwork. The CAC produced a draft dated October 18, 2012 for 
deliberation at the NA meeting. The draft, which had 124 articles containing 
about 13,800 words, was released on January 2, 2013 for public consultation 
until the end of March 2013. The process of public consultation was man­
aged under the framework of Resolution No. 38/2o12/QH13, issued by the 
NA and dated November 23, 2012. Accordingly, there were four forms of 
soliciting public consultation: (a) comments in writing sent to competent 
authorities as stipulated in Article 6 of the Resolution; (b) discussion at 
meetings, conferences, and workshops; (c) comments submitted to the elec­
tronic portal of the NA and the mass media; and (d) other relevant channels. 
The whole exercise of soliciting public consultation reflects the long­
standing tradition of mass mobilization. For example, in H6 Chi Minh City, 
the authorities organized 32,253 meetings for this purpose and delivered 
2,641,677 printed sheets of comments to households and workers.32 The 
sheet had only two options: full agreement with the draft or agreement with 
some contents and some specific contributions. According to a report by Hb 
Chi Minh City authorities, 4,356,738 individuals submitted comments, 
approximating 91 percent of the entire electorate of the city in the 2011 
election, and 96.27 percent of them indicated full agreement with the draft.33 
It is important to note that in parallel with public consultation, various 
official drafts had been produced for relevant party-state actors that were not 
made available for public viewing. After collecting public comments, the 
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Committee prepared another draft dated Aprilu, 2013, and submitted it to 
the NA Standing Committee, and then submitted a revised draft to the 
Seventh Plenum of the CPV Central Committee in early May 2013. Several 
drafts were revised and released for discussion within the NA. A draft dated 
May 17, 2013 was intended for the National Assembly meeting and another 
one dated August 26, 2013, based on comments from NA deputies, was 
intended for the NA Standing Committee and the Eighth Plenum of the 
CPV Central Committee in early October 2013. After the Eighth Plenum, 
the CAC submitted a revised draft dated October 17, 2013 to the NA plenary 
meeting as a basis for the final round of deliberation and subsequent passage. 
The final draft of the amendments was approved by the NA on November 
28, 2013 with a near-absolute support of 99.59 percent.34 
The 2012 to 2013 Constitutional Reform Process: 
Old Guards and New Players 
As the constitutional reform process played out amid poor economic per­
formance and increased political infighting between different rival factions, 
the party leaders made every effort to tread carefully and control the debates 
for the purposes of consensus and unity. Party leadership and discipline were 
exercised through eighty-one senior politicians from the 175-member 
Central Committee of the CPV, including all members of the Politburo and 
Secretariat who hold seats in the 498-member NA,35 to ensure a compliant 
legislature over the course of the constitutional amendments. The sheer fact 
that the Politburo assigned eight out of its fourteen members to the CAC 
indicates the high caution by the party to guard the constitutional reform 
process. All principal drafts were carefully considered by the CAC, the NA 
Standing Committee, the Politburo and the CPV Central Committee before 
being released to the NA for deliberation. 
The process was fixed at the outset by the party leaders. The Fifth Plenum 
of the CPV Central Committee in May 2013 delivered a conclusion on the 
scope and level of constitutional amendments. Accordingly, amendments 
were acceptable only for those issues where clarity and maturity had been 
reached, their relevance had been confirmed by realities, and there was a high 
level of consensus. 36 This instruction was repeatedly asserted by the CPV 
Secretary General Nguyen Phu TrQng throughout the constitutional reform 
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process.37 This move to pre-determine the scope of amendments indicates 
the reactive mentality prevailing among party-state leaders, and promised 
little space for any visionary changes or breakthrough in the constitutional 
amendment process. The instruction served as a prompt for both the CAC 
and the NA to rein in public discussions. 
Despite the party's close control of the process, new players and new 
forums for discussing constitutional amendments emerged and voiced stri­
dent calls for change. Upon the release of the draft amendments to the public 
in early 2013, the amendment process was widely embraced and elicited 
immense political participation from a variety of groups representing plural 
identities and interests. 
The blogosphere emerged as a major battleground for contested ideas and 
norms in the amendment consultation process. Social media, particularly 
Facebook, was another important forum for dissent over the party's control 
of the process. According to the Vietnam Internet Centre under the Ministry 
of Information and Communication, 31.3 million people, accounting for 
35.58 percent of the population, had become Internet users by November 
2012, and this number was growing fast.38 According to Socialbakers, 
a social-media analysis company, Vietnam's Facebook users reached thirteen 
million in 2013.39 As most of these Internet and Facebook users are young, 
urban and educated, they are an important audience for emerging players in 
the constitutional reform process. All new players took advantage of the 
blogosphere and social media to circulate their contestations and dissent 
over the constitutional ideas and norms. 
In a move to challenge the dominant narratives in the draft constitutional 
amendments, a seven-point petition was initiated by a group of seventy-two 
intellectuals, retired government officials, professors and independent acti­
vists on the well-known blog, Bauxite Vift Nam, on January 19, 2013.4° The 
emergence of the petition had significant meanings; such a collective action 
was unprecedented in any constitutional reform process in terms of scope 
and level of participation outside the party-state sanctioned outlets. The 
petition contained critical contestations over key constitutional ideas and 
norms that stood to test the limits of toleration by the party-state. It was 
heavily influenced by liberal ideas, with bold recommendations for the 
removal of Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution regarding party domination, 
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the separation of power, the recognition of private and community land 
ownership, stricter abidance by international human rights law, the neutral 
position of the armed forces, people's right to a referendum over the Con­
stitution, and extension of the date for public consultation on the draft 
constitutional amendment. 
Most of the seventy-two members possessed long-established creden­
tials recognized by the party-state and society at large. People like Tu<1ng 
Lai, Nguyen Trung, Diw Xuan Sam, Ph�m Chi Lan, Tan Due Nguyen, and 
Le Dang Doanh had served on the advisory boards for former Prime 
Minister V6 Van Ki�t and Phan Van Khai. High-ranking officials like 
Nguyen Dinh L(>c, former Minister of Justice, and Chu Hao, former Vice 
Minister of Science, Technology and Environment, Nguyen Minh Thuy�t, 
-former Vice Chairman of the NA Committee for Culture, Education, 
Adolescents and Children Affairs, and Hb Uy Liem, former Vice President 
of the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) 
also joined them. Well-respected public figures such as Nguyen Quang A, 
Hoang Tl,ly, Hoang Xufm Phu, Nguyen Ng<;>c, Nguyen Hu� Chi, T6ng Van 
Cong, and Le Hi�u Dang added intellectual force to the petition. Together, 
they were in a strong position to enter into dialogue with the party-state on 
the one hand and appeal to a wider audience for support on the other. On 
February 4, 2013, fifteen members representing the group handed over the 
petition to the 1992 CAC at the Office of the NA, where they had a brief 
meeting with the CAC representatives. The petition had attracted more 
than fourteen thousand signatures. 
Petition 72 was soon echoed by various other initiatives: Cung viit Hiin 
phap [Let's Draw up the Constitution], a project managed by public figures 
like Ngo Bao Chfm, Dam Thanh S<1n and Nguyen Anh Tdn on February 1, 
2013; the "Petition for the 1992 Constitutional Amendments" by a group of 
Ha N(>i Law University alumni on February 21, 2013; the "Declaration of 
Free Citizens" on the blog Dan Lam Bao [Citizen Journalist] on February 28, 
2013; and the official letter from the H(>i dbng Gi<im ml,lc Vi�t Nam [Viet­
nam Episcopal Council] (VEC) to the 1992 CAC on March 1, 2013. Also in 
March, representatives of thirty-five Vietnamese non-governmental organi­
zations (VNGOs) and disadvantaged people collectively submitted to the 
CAC a critique of some provisions of the constitutional amendments and 
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their own proposals. The diversity of collective interests in this process was 
the first of its kind in the history of the party-state. 
The party-state responded in an effort to protect the hegemonic dis­
course, but they used old-style techniques of propaganda and mass mobili­
zation. The party-state was represented by the Politburo members who hold 
office in party institutions and state agencies and presents a fac;:ade of a uni­
fied voice via its official mouthpieces. A large-scale propaganda campaign 
was conducted on the Vietnam Television (VTV) and a series of conserva­
tive state-owned newspapers such as Nhan Dan [People's Daily], Quan D<?i 
Nhan Dan [People's Army Daily], Cong An Nhan Dan [People's Public 
Security], Dt:Zi Doim Kit [Great Unity], and Ha N<?i Moi [New Ha N<)i] with 
coordination from the CPV Commission for Popularization and Education 
to play down or marginalize the voices differing from the orthodox narra-. 
tives during the constitutional consultation process. The 1992 CAC took 
another step to instruct local authorities to disseminate the draft constitu­
tional amendments to each household throughout the country for their 
feedback. According to a report to the NA Standing Committee, more than 
twenty-six million contributory comments had been collected and 28,140 
seminars and meetings held during the three months of public consultation, 
of which an absolute majority indicated general agreement with the draft.41 
This exercise is reminiscent of the same tactics used for the preparation of 
the 1980 Constitution and 1992 Constitution. The draft circulated for public 
feedback in 1980 claimed to receive twenty million contributory comments, 
and in Ha N<)i alone half a million people participated in 3,6oo meetings and 
contributed 1.4 million ideas on the 1992 draft Constitution.42 
Party Domination 
The issue of party domination has been central to the process of constitu­
tional amendment in Vietnam. It subsumes almost every other important 
theme throughout the Constitution and the politics of constitutional reform. 
As early as 1990, Nguyen Ki�n Giang pointed out how Article 4 of the 
Constitution, on party domination, is a root cause of Vietnam's governance 
problems.43 At a March 12, 1992 meeting of the Central Committee of the 
Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) on the draft constitutional amendments, 
Phan Dinh Di�u rigorously questioned the validity of Article 4.44 The issue 
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of party dominance was raised again from different perspectives in the 2001 
discussion on constitutional revision.45 Although party-state leaders have 
always vehemently opposed the removal of Article 4 in the Constitution,46 
ongoing discussions on the role of the party and revisions to this article have 
characterized all new approaches to the legal status of party institutions and 
members. 
The discours� on the role of the CPV in relation to the rule of law, to 
a law-based state, and to all state institutions and mass organizations stip­
ulated in the Constitution including the NA, the State President, the Gov­
ernment, the Court, the Procuracy, the military, VFF, and the Vietnam 
General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is of utmost importance to under­
standing the politics of constitutional reform. All actors and institutions 
involved in constitutional politics, whether from the, party-state institutions 
and mass organizations or from societal groups, independent bloggers or 
dissidents at home and overseas are subject to a different degree to the power 
of this discourse as it serves a foundational basis that structures and coordi­
nates their positions, views, and actions. However, different actors with their 
own identities and interests have different assumptions and give different 
meanings to the discourse of party dominance. 
Leaders of the party-state have long asserted that CPV domination is 
responsible for all glorious victories over enemies, 47 notably colonial and 
imperialist powers, for winning independence for the country and re-uniting 
the country, for the success of D6i Moi and international integration, for 
bringing about people's economic prosperity and social justice, and for 
demonstrating moral righteousness and intellectual superiority. On such 
grounds, the CPV seems to have established a sublime legitimacy to rule. 
One-party rule is cast as the meaning of leadership, with the CPV as 'the 
force leading the state and society.' The slogan that "the leadership of the 
party is the decisive determinant of all victories of the Vietnamese Revolu­
tion," which has become obligatory in every discourse, speaks to the funda­
mentally rhetorical underpinnings of CPV legitimacy. 
The principle of party leadership or supremacy is codified into rules and 
norms, both explicitly and implicitly, in the Constitution. The most explicit 
rule is Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution, which implicitly overshadows 
almost every other article. This rule has become an absolute truth to be 
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tightly securitized so that no attack on it can exert any effect or be legiti­
mated at all. Thus, besides the regulative meaning (what discourse/behavior 
is permitted and what is prohibited), it acts as a constitutive norm in the 
sense that it shapes what kind of actor that actor actually is.48 In this line of 
logic, the CPV claims to command the absolute allegiance of the military in 
the Constitution. However this crucial claim to paramountcy is not fixed in 
meaning; during the process of constitutional amendment it was challenged 
and defied, and hence has undergone subtle shifts. 
The proposed amendment to Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution in the 
draft released for public consultation saw significant changes even though 
the effects might still be in question. The crucial change is that in a sense the 
leaders have accepted that the party's leadership is no longer taken for 
granted but contingent on its fulfillment of responsibilities before the people. 
The new version added two important stipulations (the accountability of the 
party to the people in its decision-making and the subjugation of party 
members to the Constitution and law). These changes reflect a rough con­
sensus after long deliberation within the party-state about the role of the 
party and its responsibilities. The 1992 Constitution is silent on a clear role 
and relationship between the party as an entity toward the law and all other 
state institutions. Sidel makes a pertinent point on this vagueness: 
At each juncture, whether voiced formally or not, a key problem has been that 
the party is predominant in all of these institutions but that the Constitution 
does not spell out the party's full or detailed role, making structural change 
through constitutional revision an even more complicated matter than it 
otherwise naturally is.49 
There have been mounting pressures on holding the party accountable 
before the people and party members before law. In the months leading up to 
the Eleventh National Congress of the CPV, former NA Chairman Nguyen 
Van An, in an unusual interview with Vietnamnet, expressed his deep dis­
satisfaction with the the constitutional constraints on the party's power and 
called for a law on the party to fix "systemic problems." At a meeting 
organized by the VFF in February 2013, Hoang Thai, a former standing 
member of the VFF Central Committee, made a very sharp comment: 
"There are laws all on the State, the NA, the VFF, but no law on the party. 
This content downloaded from 130.194.20.173 on Wed. 14 Jan 2015 20:25:43 PM 
All use subject to JSTOR Tenns :md Conditions 
1 6  T H i £ M  
There must be a law on the party to ensure openness and transparency as 
well as to avoid arbitrariness."so At the same meeting, Nguyen Kh<l.nh, 
former Deputy Prime Minister, requested to provide for the people exercise 
of a power of oversight over the party in accordance with a law on social 
oversight and feedback. These comments reflected an official view by the VFF, 
which submitted a proposal in June 2012 for amending Article 4 on the 
accountability of the party and every party member to prevent party members' 
tendencies of operating outside the law and committing rampant corruption 
without due punishment. 51 This bold proposal surprised many observers since 
it deviated from the traditional notion of a VFF compliant to the party. The 
proposed amendment to Article 4 has in fact incorporated substantive con­
cessions by the party-state leaders to produce consent among the official circle 
and the people. This indicates the recognition of a new language game that has 
been enlarged for wider participation and contestation. 
At the NA meeting on November 19, 2012 for deliberation of the con­
stitutional amendments, Tn.tang TrQng Nghia, Vice Chairman of the Viet­
nam Bar Federation (VBF) and an NA deputy, explained the delicate 
meaning of the new addition on the accountability of the party: 
Concerning Article 4 and the Party, we have three different entities: first is the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, second is party organizations, and third is party 
members. Designing Article 4, we ignore the most important entity, that is the 
Party as a whole, thus we stipulate that only Party organizations and members 
operate within the framework of the Constitution and law. Concerning Article 
4, I add just one more word at the forefront, namely "the Party, Party orga­
nizations and members operate within the framework of the Constitution and 
law."52 
As a lawyer, Tn:iO'ng TrQng Nghia understood very well the implication of 
a legal entity and implicitly pointed to the role of the CPV in relation to the 
rule of law. He represented the fundamental interest of lawyers as a profes­
sional association despite VBF's structural ties to the party-state. 
Meanwhile Petition 72, representing the efforts of "the newly empowered 
agents of modernity," questioned the pre-determination of the leadership of 
a particular political organization and requested that the leadership be 
elected by the people. Unlike radical political dissidents inside Vietnam and 
abroad, this group did not reject the leadership of the party but tried to tie it 
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to the conditions of a free and fair election in the context of political com­
petition. In an open challenge to the party-state's securitization of Article 4, 
Hoang Xuan Phu, a mathematics professor and a signatory to Petition 72, 
entered the language game with a highly critical analysis of the linguistic 
logic and wording tactics in various Articles of the 1992 Constitution: 
The above cited articles demonstrate that wherever necessary, Constitution 
drafters remember to use the word "must" or equivalent to stress the 
"requirement." They intentionally "forget" to use the word "must" in Article 4· 
Therefore, the Constitution grants the CPV absolute power without requiring 
it to implement anything, including the obligation "to strictly abide by the 
Constitution and law" as stipulated in Article 12 for the society and societal 
members. 53 
Tne· collective view of Group 72 and Hoang Xuan Phu was shared by 
other prominent members of the group, such as Tucmg Lai, Nguyen Trung, 
T6ng Van Cong, and Le Hi�u Dang, all formerly in the elite ranks of the party­
state. They have also all been prolific writers on the urgency for a "peaceful 
evolution" of the party-state into a democratic institution, advocating a new 
order in which the willing agency of representatives of the old order plays 
a crucial role through a political reform embraced in the process of amending 
the 1992 Constitution.54 Nguyen Trung strongly challenged the principle of 
party paramountcy on the basis of rule of law and insisted on the para­
mountcy of the Constitution. 55 T6ng Van Cong also pointed out the inherent 
tensio� between the rule of law, or a law-based state, with party paramountcy 
and the inextricable link between the separation of power and democracy. 56 Le 
Hi�u Dang argued for the urgent need for political competition. Their dis­
cursive power was strong enough to shape the counter-hegemonic narrative of 
party domination both in the blogosphere and in the public. 
Other groups such as the VEC, a significant religious interest group, and 
the group Cac Cong dan Tt,t do [Free Citizens] ,  representing a large blogo­
sphere interest group, raised similar contestations with different layers of 
meanings concerning party domination and the concentration of power. In 
March 2013, the the VEC wrote: 
The root cause is a lack of distinction between the ruling party and the law­
based state. This is reflected in the 1992 Constitution and the draft 
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constitutional amendments continue that line [of vagueness]. On the one 
hand, Article 74 confirms that the NA is "the highest state power body," and 
on the other hand, Article 4 asserts that the ruling party is "the force leading 
the state and society." Is the NA a tool of the ruling party? If so, what is the 
meaning of the people electing NA deputies? A truly free choice or a sort of 
democracy in formality?S7 
The Cimg vi�t Hi�n phap group had an ambivalent view about party dom­
inance. While they acknowledged the irrelevance of Article 4, they were 
concerned about the consequences of removing it: 
We think that the inclusion of Article 4 in the 1980 Constitution on the Party's 
leadership is not really necessary, however, it is a historical reality. We believe 
that in the current circumstance, the removal of Article 4 might result in 
unpredictable consequences for the COUntry's development and Stability.S8 
Meanwhile the VNGOs and representatives of disadvantaged groups such as 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders, people with disabilities, and those 
with HIV I AIDS, participated in the discourse from a different angle. They 
did not explicitly contest the principle of party paramountcy, but instead 
offered a human rights-based approach to the Constitution and appealed to 
international human rights law as their basis of legitimacy in the constitu­
tional dialogue with the party-state. In effect, their identity-based claim for 
the supremacy of human rights, especially the rights of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, challenged some critical aspects of party domination. 
They adopted measures that were more accommodating and less confron­
tational to the party-state. The NGOs mainly took advantage of the invited 
space to sell their approach to reform. For example, they organized meetings 
and conferences, collected comments and used the official channels to con­
vey the ideas for reforms. In March 2013, representatives from thirty-five 
VNGOs met with the CAC representatives to submit their petition. 
These societal groups and individuals were trying to illustrate alterna­
tives to orthodox narratives on party-state dominance of the governance 
system and the kind of power that the party holds. Their message is that the 
party-state mistakes power for influence. Influence, which is relative and 
situation-specific, is a psychological relationship based on ties that tran­
scend momentary interests. 59 Party-state leaders interpret this meaning by 
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employing strategies and tactics to transform the raw attributes of power 
into political influence through generating rationalities and consensus. 
The response from the party-state was a mixture of concession, coercion, 
and co-optation. In the first major reaction, CPV General Secretary Nguyen 
Phu Tn;mg labelled those demanding the removal of Article 4, non­
politicization of the military, and separation of powers as politically and 
ideologically retrograde.60 However, the party-state did accommodate some 
of the demands of these societal groups. Approaching the end of the tirneline 
for public consultation, the CAC urged all state institutions at the central 
and local levels to extend the date until the end of September 2013. The CAC 
also designated more options for important articles in later versions of the 
draft constitutional amendments to be subject to discussion. In the end, 
there were some alterations to Article 4 with regards to the relationship._. 
between the party and the people, the accountability of the party to the 
people for its decision-making, and the legal framework for party members. 
Significantly, despite an assertion of the unified nature of state power, the 
fmally amended Constitution for the first time formally recognized key 
elements such as division, coordination and checks between legislative, 
executive, and judiciary powers which belong clearly to the NA, the Gov­
ernment, and the Courts. In fact, such syncretism is generating substantive 
conditions for the separation of power. 
Constitutional Review 
The theme of constitutional review has been influential in the political and 
.legal discourse for more than a decade. It prominently emerged in the 2001 
process of constitutional amendment, was silenced thereafter and re­
emerged throughout the decade with its pinnacle at the 2006 National 
Congress of the CPV.61 However, it was almost abandoned by the party 
in the late 2ooos before regaining prominence in the constitutional amend­
ment process. It is worth noting that the discourse of constitutional review is 
of special interest to many legal scholars and officials within the party-state 
and mass organizations though it attracts little attention from other societal 
groups except for the VNGOs. Contestations and struggle for power in the 
discourse of constitutional review mostly have taken place in limited official 
legal and political circles. 
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The core issue in this discourse is to what extent party-state leaders accept 
to recognize and practice self-restraint in terms of power, or "control power" 
as re-worded in the description of the "socialist law-based state" approved by 
the Eleventh National Congress of the CPV. It has been the contestations of 
those who have urged the party to transfer some formal and substantive 
power to state institutions that have driven the discourse of constitutional 
review. Their argument is that the party should focus on strategic leadership, 
control from a distance, and refrain from intervening directly into those 
affairs under the mandate of state institutions. A key question should be 
asked: why is it necessary to have some constitutional review mechanism, of 
any model, in a one-party rule? 
An institution empowered with constitutional review capacities would be 
granted with judiciary power of some sort. At least three models of coostitu- . 
tional review (i.e., the US Court system, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany and the Constitutional Council of France) have been carefully stud­
ied and put on the table for discussion.62 There have been heated debates 
among those supporting different models and those seriously questioning the 
need for such models in Vietnam at all. In theory, a constitutional review body 
functions first as an arbiter of disputes and conflicts between state institutions 
in the grey area between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches, and 
second as a guarantor of the rules of the game codified in the Constitution 
about state-society relations, namely the protection of human rights. All these 
functions historically have been exercised by the CPV even though some 
specific tasks of ensuring the constitutionality and legality in the legal system 
and in practices have been delegated to various state institutions. In fact, all 
major controversial cases of constitutional violation by state institutions are 
reported to the CPV Politburo for instructions and a fmal decision.63 A spe­
cialized and centralized body of constitutional review would take that formal 
mandate and require a mechanism of power-sharing from th·e CPV, both in 
formal and substantive terms. Whether such a body would have adjudicative 
or only advisory power, it would defmitely add complexity to power relations 
and be an important player in Vietnamese politics; whether it can transform 
its power into influence is a different question. 
A critical examination of three different versions of the draft constitu­
tional amendments released sequentially by the CAC can shed clearer light 
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on the dynamics of contestation and change in this discourse. The January 
2013 version for public consultation proposed a new article, numbered 120, 
on the Constitutional Council; its proposed mandate, which allows the 
Council to make recommendations only, is basically an advisory power and 
is subject to the NA. The provision is short and simple with three items. 
A strong critique of that proposal is that it does not look any different from 
a committee under the NA and the Law Committee is already doing that job. 
However, the mere appearance of such an institution in the Constitution has 
a significant meaning. It indicates certain compromise within the party-state 
circle about its necessity and a formal recognition of a norm. It was a positive 
signal for many, given the fact that the idea of constitutional review was 
almost set aside by the party leaders in 2009. 
But this positive step hit a backlash in May 2013 when a revised version 
was submitted to the NA after some months of public consultation, internal 
debates of the CAC, and deliberation at the Eighth Plenum of the CPV 
Central Committee. Two options in the new draft clearly showed the revi­
sionist turn: the first was the abolition of Article 120, or its inclusion without 
any constitutional review body; the second option was to include Article 120, 
but with revised wording. There is little doubt that the May version prior­
itizes the first option, which reflects the prevailing view of those who are 
concerned that a constitutional review body could eclipse the discretionary 
power of the party and their freedom to act, and therefore oppose the 
inception of such an institution. The second option was countered with 
considerable resistance from within official inner circles. 
The August 2013 version of the constitutional amendments saw another 
sharp change in course. There no longer existed two options. A new proposal 
was made in Article 1 1 7  of the draft, which confirmed the inception of the 
Constitutional Council and stressed its independence. The more detailed 
and clearer role of the Council was spelled out in seven items. Accordingly, 
the Council was now granted with more substantive adjudicative powers. 
It could adjudicate and make conclusive rulings on all the legal documents 
issued by the NA, die NA Standing Committee, the State President, the 
Government, the Prime Minister, Ministers, the People's Supreme Court, 
and the People's Procuracy, and review the constitutionality of signed inter­
national treaties before ratification. This proposal for an even more powerful 
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constitutional review is phenomenal, indicating complex dynamics of con­
testations and change in the discourse. It received conspicuous support from 
a number of full-time NA deputies.64 
This radical version of a constitutional review mechanism was quickly 
subsumed by the conservative view about the exclusive power of the party. 
An abrupt high-level volte-face was seen in the October 2013 draft after the 
conclusion of the Eighth Plenum of the CPV Central Committee. The final 
amended Constitution rejects any inclusion of a Constitutional Council and 
continues with the existing model of constitutional protection by all relevant 
state institutions despite the recognized flaws. After all, there was no change 
with regard to constitutional review in the 2013 Constitution, which re­
flected the prevailing influence of the old guards in the party-state to protect 
their perceived vested interests. The avoidance of embracing new solutions . 
for an age-old problem indicates a high level of ambivalence over constitu­
tional review. It means that the problem is left unsettled and the issue seems 
set to recur sooner or later. The discourse of constitutional review has 
established a firm place for shaping and coordinating views and behaviors 
of different actors and institutions in Vietnamese politics. 
Popular Sovereignty over the Constitution 
A parallel discourse is of the people's constitutional sovereignty. In Vietnam, 
people's sovereignty [chu quy�n nhan dan] has strong rhetorical power to 
which the party-state and every societal group appeal in order to lay founda­
tions for their legitimacy. However, each group represents their interests and 
constructs its meaning in a different way. Legal scholars of liberal thinking 
often trace this notion back to the writings of John Locke and Jean Jacque 
Rousseau on the fictional social contract between the people and the state to 
challenge tyrannical rule.65 According to this influential strand of thought, 
state power originates from the people and a constitution could be compa­
rable to a social contract in which the people hold supreme power over the 
making and amending of the constitution. Therefore, constitution making 
and amending is an original power of the people and it can never be 
deprived by the state. This notion of people's constitutional sovereignty has 
influenced the view of many in legal academia, activists, intellectuals, 
VNGOs, religious organizations and even the government circle. 
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Various non-state actors vigorously supported a referendum on the con­
stitutional amendments. Petition 72 was among the first collective efforts to 
assert the people's sovereignty in the process of making and amending the 
Constitution by returning the constituent power from the NA to the people: 
"The constituent power (making, enacting, or amending the Constitution) is 
the original power from which derives other powers (legislative, executive, 
and judiciary), thus it belongs to the entire people and cannot belong to any 
institution, even the NA."66 The VEC in its letter to the CAC had a similar 
argument. The proposal by the thirty-five VNGOs to the CAC also empha­
sized that "ensuring the constitution making and amending power belong­
ing to the people is a key element to implement the people's right to 
participation in governance of the state and society."67 A survey conducted 
by the Vietnam Lawyers Association (VLA) and the United Natio�s Devel­
opment Program (UNDP) in Vietnam revealed that 316 out of 345 profes­
sional and social organizations (PSOs), twenty-five out of thirty-six civil 
society organizations (CSOs), and four out of nine religious organizations 
subscribed to a vote on the amended constitution. 68 
Officials from the party-state also recognized the common language of 
popular sovereignty manifested through a referendum on constitutional 
amendments. Nguyen Van Thu�n, standing member of the editorial board 
of the 1992 CAC and former Chairman of the NA Law Committee, com­
mented on the significance of the first-time inclusion of the term "people's 
sovereignty" in the draft Constitution's preamble and the removal of the 
assertion that "the NA is the only body with constitution making and 
amending power."69 He considered them important changes that accommo­
date the demand for exercise of the people's constitutional sovereignty. 
In a collective proposal on the constitutional amendments as an executive 
branch, the government confirmed that the constitution making and 
amending power is the highest representation of the people's sovereignty.7° 
The core practical connotation in the discourse of people's sovereignty was 
a referendum on the final draft of the constitutional amendments. There has 
been a strong emphasis on direct democracy over representative democracy 
in exercising a referendum for a Constitution. 
However, objections to a popular vote on constitutional amendments 
through a referendum came from both within and without the party-state 
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establishment. A number of interviewees from PSOs and CSOs in  the 
VLA-UNDP survey questioned the meaning of such a referendum, main­
taining that the general public's lack of sufficient knowledge and expertise on 
such a technically sophisticated legal text would make the referendum costly, 
cosmetic and meaningless.71 In an article on Cimg vdt Hiin phap, Mai Thai 
Linh disputed the idea that constituent power directly exercised by the 
people in a referendum should qualify for people's sovereignty and argued 
that popular sovereignty over the Constitution must, fust and foremost, be 
exercised by democratically electing a constituent institutionP On different 
grounds, the CAC itself did not support the idea of a referendum on the 
amended constitution, reasoning that the people have participated in all 
constituent processes ranging from reviewing the Constitution's implemen­
tation .to commenting on the draft, which essentially reflects the will: .. and 
intellect of the people, thus the NA's approval of the Constitution is in 
accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty.73 
The radical demand for a referendum on the amended constitution 
was compromised by the party-state leaders. In fact, it was mediated through 
the construction of language in the draft constitutional amendments: "The 
Constitution is passed with affirmative votes of at least two-thirds of NA 
deputies. The referendum on the Constitution shall be decided by the NA." 
This provision placed the possibility of organizing a referendum at the 
discretion of the NA. It implicitly meant that the CPV still held firm control 
on such a decision and that a referendum would not be organized for this 
round of the 1992 constitutional amendments. The proposed provision 
received consensus among the party-state leaders and it remained 
unchanged in the final version of the amended Constitution. 
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated how discourses across key themes in the 
process of amending the Constitution are enlarging the political space for 
plural interests and identity claims to fmd expression. These discourses are 
inter-related and interactive, and are subsumed by the encompassing dis­
course of party domination, which runs through all these sets of debate. 
As seen through these discourses, the process of amending the Constitution 
in the period between 2011 and 2013 could no longer be a showcase of broad 
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social consensus around amendments to a key political and legal document; 
nor could it fulfill the wishful thinking of the party-state for a public spec­
tacle of ideological stability and harmonious integration. The party-state 
leaders found themselves struggling to manage the diverse and strident calls 
for change and to accommodate wider political participation from emerging 
players. 
Across these discourses, meanings and power relations are not as ftxed as 
assumed in the dominant orthodox narrative, but are changing because they 
are constantly constructed, reconstructed and deconstructed by the repre­
sentatives of different societal interest groups. Owing to this kind of con­
testatory pluralism, overt disputes and challenges now broadly characterize 
constitutional reform discourse. They come in various forms of defiance to 
rules and norms both codified in the existing Constitution and constitutive 
of the view and practices of the party-state. The party leaders' resistance to 
major reforms of the Constitution reflects a defensive position and an 
ambivalent view about dealing with critical governance problems. However, 
the very robustness of the process suggests that it might be impossible to 
defer indefinitely key reform proposals if the political regime is to survive. 
It should be noted that dialogues, debates and clashes in constitutional 
politics are not a new phenomenon in Vietnam or elsewhere; however, what 
is unprecedented in Vietnam is their visibility, scope and intensity. What 
makes contemporary constitutional debates in Vietnam so interesting are 
the dynamics of the discourses, which show how conflict is openly driving 
significant change in public thinking about foundational political principles. 
Contestations and conflict accumulated since Dbi M&i have been raised to 
such a level and scope that it has become extremely difficult for fixed dom­
inant orthodox narratives to maintain hegemonic entitlement without rec­
ognizing differences and co-opting new elements. The party-state is now 
struggling to maintain hegemony in these discourses by ideational coercion 
or propaganda strategies. The establishment also has been compelled to 
employ concessions to produce consent across the wide spectrum of these 
key discourses and embrace new instrumental rationalities to legitimize their 
identity claims. Inevitably, elite interest groups are making efforts to accom­
modate the diverse interests of other society groups and broader political 
participation. However, the tacit recognition of plural interests and identities 
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by the party-state has not resulted in a long-awaited democratic transition or 
a pluralist political system; they have only brought about changes with 
ambiguous implications for democratization. What is more certain is that 
the gradualism and syncretism embedded in Vietnamese constitutional pol­
itics are giving way to more publicly contlictual drivers of change. 
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A B S T R A C T  
The paper explores contestations playing out in constitutional debates 
around the 1 992 constitutional amendments with a focal point in the 
exercise of discursive power and struggles for change. The paper discusses the 
significance of conflict in the constitutional reform process re-initiated in 
201 1 .  It demonstrates how the emphasis on stability and harmonious inte­
gration in initial constitutional amendment proposals has been compro­
mised and renegotiated in the face of sustained criticisms of the constitution 
that draw on non-orthodox ideological foundations. The contestations that 
characterize constitutional reform discourse reveals how conflict is a signi­
ficant driver of the changes presently underway in Vietnam. 
K E Y  w o R D s :  Constitution, Communist Party of Vietnam, National 
Assembly, politics, discourse 
Notes 
1. According to the World Bank statistics on Vietnam's GDP, the economic growth 
rate fell to 6-4 percent in 2010, 6.2 percent in 2011, and 5.2 percent in 2012, and 5-4 
percent for 2013. The average rate is much lower than that of the previous years 
and falls short of the 6.5 to 7 percent goal set in the five-year socio-economic plan 
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